加拿大论文代写被发现：人类/动物的意识
动物福利科学本身分为两个部分,认知行为学,关注动物的知识能力和意识,然后有动物福利科学处理方面是否动物感到疼痛。道金斯,无论该部门讨论,不能反驳,人类意识的观点本身是一个较新的一个。人们的主观经验和他们的私人世界来分析只有在20世纪的后半部分,和动物意识这样甚至不是采用相同的序列的推理。间接的方法假设或识别动物的感情似乎是它的核心,这可能不是精确的科学。虽然有生理和行为相似性时,人类和动物的意识,科学家们仍然解释实证结果不同。最后,生物不能谈论它主观经验本身是一个巨大的威慑。亚历克斯和格里芬,尽管训练不能说出来什么在他们的大脑组织。
格里芬(2001)认为,动物有情感状态并能够(恐惧)检索这些州采取行动为自己的幸福。作者用一个例子解释捕食者和猎物。作者认为,在一个非常简单的层面上,这些动物可能拥有一种反思意识的状态。与道金斯(2015)认为,不同的科学家可能理解动物脑震荡的现象不同,格里芬关注如何确实有一个动物意识,但这是非常不同于人类。
加拿大论文代写被发现：人类/动物的意识
Animal welfare science is by itself divided into two sections, the cognitive ethology that focuses on the intellectual abilities of animal and consciousness and then there was animal welfare science which dealt with the aspects of whether animals felt pain. Dawkins, discusses that irrespective of the division, it cannot be refuted that the view of human consciousness is by itself a newer one. People’s subjective experiences and their private world came to be analyzed only in the latter part of the twentieth century, and animal consciousness as such is not even adopted from the same sequence of reasoning. Indirect ways of assuming or identifying the feelings of animals seems to be the core of this, and this might not be exact science. While there are physiological and behavioral similarities when it comes to human and animal consciousness, scientists still interpret empirical findings differently. At the end, that the organism cannot speak up about it subjective experiences by itself is a big deterrent. Alex and Griffin, although trained are not able to speak up about what goes on in their brain tissues.
Griffin (2001) argues that animals do have emotional states and are able to (in fear) retrieve those states so as to act for their well being. The author explains this with an example of a predator and a prey. The author argues that at a very simple level, the animals might possess a state of reflective consciousness. Unlike Dawkins (2015) who argues that different scientists might understand the phenomenon of animal concussions differently, Griffin focuses on how there is indeed an animal consciousness, but which is very different from that of humans.